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ABSTRACT
It is commonly assumed that the 
ACTU is the most important peak 
union council in Australia, since it is 
a national body, which has had no 
serious rivals for fourteen years. 
During the last decade its authority 
and prestige have also expanded 
dramatically, largely as a result of its 
special relationship with the federal 
ALP government, underwritten by the ‘ 
Accord in its various forms. However, 
this paper argues that the recent 
period is an aberration, departing 
from the historical norm, and unlikely 
to be maintained in the long term. For 
a num ber of historical reasons 
outlined here, the Labor Council of 
New South Wales has been the main 
instigator of industrial reform in 
Australia.
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INTRODUCTION
It is commonly assumed that the ACTU is the most important 
peak union council in Australia. However, this apparently 
obvious assumption has rarely been tested in the literature of 
labour history and industrial relations. Indeed, the literature 
relating to the role of peak union councils in general has been 
rather limited, and that which exists has been almost exclusively 
devoted to the authority of the national peak council, the ACTU.
This is surprising because it has always been recognised that 
the state labour councils were important in the formation and 
operations of the ACTU, especially its pre-1947 activities. As 
Gollan noted: 'the way in which the ACTU functioned left most 
real authority in the hands of the individual unions and the state 
trades and labour councils'1. The ACTU's then president, Albert 
Monk, claimed at the 1940 Congress that 'in the early years it had 
simply existed, and it would not have done so had it not been for 
loans advanced by the Melbourne THC'2. Unlike the state labour 
councils, the ACTU did not even have a full-time official until 
1943.
From the Second World War onwards, the role of the ACTU in 
Australian industrial relations and union affairs expanded, and 
hence, it is largely this more recent period of ACTU history with 
which most of the literature is concerned. In 1947 the state labour 
councils finally renounced their veto power over ACTU Congress 
decisions, which had been proposed by Congress since 1943.3 
From the late 1950s Martin argued that the role and authority of 
the ACTU had significantly increased since the 1940s to surpass 
that of the TUC in Britain, even though the ACTU still lacked 
substantial formal control over affiliates. Martin noted a growing 
acceptance of ACTU authority in industrial disputes by 
affiliates, particularly in key industries such as the waterfront
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and mining, in co-ordinating public sector union claims, and in 
formulating basic wage case submissions. The latter role virtually 
ensured a place for the ACTU in industrial relations under a 
centralised system of wage determination. But Martin also noted 
the growth in union affiliations and incorporation of industry 
groups of unions into the ACTU's structure as important 
elements contributing to its enhanced authority.4
Other commentators on the ACTU's role in the 1950s were 
less convinced of its emerging authority, particularly with regard 
to industrial disputes.5 Nevertheless, Martin's interpretation was 
influential until challenged by Dabscheck in 1977.6 From then 
until the mid-1980s the general consensus was that the ACTU's 
authority over affiliates is relatively weak.7 Subsequently, a new 
consensus has developed that the ACTU's general authority has 
increased dramatically, as a result of its absorption of ACSPA 
and CAGEO from 1979 to 1981 to become the sole national peak 
union council, and especially since 1983 as a result of the special 
relationship between the ACTU and the ALP government 
characterised by the various versions of the Accord.8
A notable omission in all of this literature remains the 
comparison with the authority of state labour councils. It is still 
simply assumed that the national peak body is more important. It 
is not the purpose of this paper to evaluate the respective claims, 
in themselves, in this literature over time, but to introduce a new 
element of evaluation by comparison with the premier state peak 
union council in Australia. In doing so, I have broadened the focus 
away from the concept of authority to that of general significance 
in affecting the industrial relations environment of Australia. I 
employ three of Martin's yardsticks for evaluating relative 
authority:
• membership of affiliates, in aggregate and as a 
proportion of all trade unionists and the workforce;
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• the industrial function of the peak body, in terms of its 
role in bargaining and/or arbitration, controlling 
industrial action, and intervening in demarcation 
disputes between unions; and
• the political function of the peak council.
A fourth yardstick employed by Martin refers to the structural 
diffusion of power within the organisation, between the executive 
and the affiliates, including the governmental powers exercised 
over the affiliates. For the purposes of this article, I have 
subsumed consideration of this under the yardstick relating to 
industrial function, since this is where much of the literature has 
concentrated when discussing internal diffusion of power. 
However, I have added one extra yardstick derived from 
Headey's check-list,9 namely:
• the level of resources, including staff, but especially 
finances.
Historically, the argument in this article is largely based upon 
the Labor Council's senior status amongst peak union councils in 
Australia, the federal structure of industrial relations, and the 
Labor Council’s close relationship with the most electorally 
successful state branch of the ALP. The last section examines the 
changes in industrial relations since 1983, and speculates on their 
likely future impact on the relative significance of the Labor 
Council of NSW and the ACTU.
ORIGINS
The Labor Council, founded in 1871 as the Trades and Labour 
Council of Sydney, is the oldest peak union body in Australia,
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and one of the oldest in the world. Its only possible rival as the 
oldest Australian peak body is the Melbourne Trades Hall 
Council, which was founded in 1856, but until 1883 it was 
essentially a building management committee rather than a peak 
council.10 The London Trades Council was the earliest English 
peak body to be formed, in I860, and the English Trades Union 
Congress began in 1868, only three years before the formation of 
the Sydney TLC.11
The ACTU was not formed until 1927. Prior to then, on those 
rare occasions when government needed to consult with 
representatives of the union movement at a national level, the 
Labor Council was one of the two principal bodies chosen, 
usually with the Melbourne Trades Hall Council, and sometimes 
with the AWU. All three were influential with the federal ALP, in 
or out of government. Even for the Industrial Peace Conferences 
called by the Nationalist federal government in 1928-9, 
immediately after the formation of the ACTU, the NSW and 
M elbourne Labor Councils were the principal union 
representatives.12
In the formation of the ACTU itself, the Labor Council was 
arguably the single most important force. The earliest instance of 
interstate or national union organisation were the seven 
Intercolonial Trades Union Congresses of 1879-91. These were 
initiated by the Sydney TLC when it organised the first of these 
congresses in 1879 (and the third in 1885).13 The 1891 congress 
formed the Australasian Labour Federation, but only in 
Queensland and briefly NSW, did this become operational.14 In 
1902 the Labor Council instigated the first, and in 1918 the 
largest, of six Interstate Congresses of Trade Unions organised 
between those two dates.15 These were succeeded by the four 
All-Australian Trade Union Congresses of 1919, 1921, 1922, and
1926. The Labor Council played a major role in all of these 
congresses, particularly in organising the early ones. Its secretary,
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E. J. Kavanagh, was elected secretary of the first Federal Grand 
Council of Labour, which was formed at the 1913 Congress.16
As with their nineteenth century predecessors, these 
congresses were essentially discussion forums over industrial 
grievances and political issues. But from the outset the 
Congresses were interested in developing some form of national 
labour federation, led by the Labor Council of NSW. From 1902 
this idea was subject to various proposals and planning 
refinements to give it effect. As might be expected, given the 
momentum provided by the Labor Council, the proposals 
revolved around relatively loose federations of state labour 
councils, upon which representation for the congresses themselves 
was largely based.17 However, as large national unions began to 
emerge, they favoured a more centralised national organisation 
based on direct union representation. Hence, a rival Australian 
Labour Federation was formed representing large unions in 1914, 
but it was unsuccessful in gaining full commitment from its 
members and soon faded from view.18
From about 1915 the issue of union federation became 
subsumed in notions of closer organisation in the One Big Union 
Movement. The OBU broadened the basis of support for the 
ideas of the radical syndicalist IWW (Industrial Workers of the 
World), which had advocated the complete federation of all 
unions in one large organisation which lowered all craft and 
occupational barriers.19 From 1916 the Labor Council became the 
major exponent of the OBU, and the 1918 Interstate Congress 
organised, and dominated, by it in Sydney was preoccupied with 
this issue, as were the succeeding All-Australian Trades Union 
Congresses. The Labor Council's secretary, Jock Garden, became 
secretary of the OBU's Organising and Propaganda Committee at 
the 1918 congress, which also adopted the Council's IWW-based 
preamble committing it to class struggle, in preference to the 
AWU's more moderate version.20 The OBU scheme was again
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endorsed at the 1919 congress, and the subsequent congresses of 
1921-2 took organisational steps in this direction, particularly 
with the establishment of the Commonwealth Council of 
A ction .21 However, opposition to the OBU emerged at the 
federal and NSW ALP conferences from 1919, and from 
moderate unions, especially the AWU. The refusal of the 
Commonwealth Industrial Registrar to register the OBU in 1924 
marked the effective defeat of this movement.22
Nevertheless, when the ACTU was formed in 1927 it was 
largely as a result of the Labor Council's momentum in this area. 
In July 1925 the Labor Council, in association with the Melbourne 
Trades Hall Council, organised a meeting of labour council 
delegates from all states in Adelaide. This formed the 
Commonwealth Industrial Disputes Committee to control 
disputes referred to it by the labour councils.23 Although this 
committee was never active, the momentum for national 
organisation persisted with a further conference of state labour 
councils in 1926, to support the 44 hour week and oppose the 
federal government's legislation for increasing its own industrial 
powers. The latter was supported by the federal parliamentary 
Labor Party and the Commonwealth Council of Federated 
Unions (CCFU), which had been formed in 1923 by moderate 
unions disillusioned with the OBU, mainly based in Victoria. 
Hence, the labour councils' activities were partly designed to 
prevent losing the initiative to a national federation based on 
unions rather than state councils. The labour councils then 
asserted themselves further through the Commonwealth Council 
of Action, which called the third All-Australian Trade Union 
Congress of 1926.24 Held in Sydney, it was dominated by the 
Labor Council of NSW, numerically and in terms of initiative. It 
unanimously adopted Garden's motion for the formation of a 
permanent central organisation at the national level, based on an 
annual congress. Garden was also elected to the committee of five
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charged with organising a further congress in 1927. This was duly- 
held in Melbourne to form the ACTU.25
The Labor Council of NSW had a major impact on the nature 
of the ACTU, since its constitution was based largely on NSW 
proposals, with Garden playing a leading role in this area. The 
ACTU's objective for 'the socialization of industry', and its 
primary 'constitutional method' of supplanting craft with 
industrial unionism,26 indicated the continuing influence of the 
OBU, principally via the Labor Council. A major structural 
presence was also given the state labour councils. They became 
the state branches of the ACTU, with power of veto over 
congress decisions until 1947, and with majority representation 
on the executive until 1957.27 In 1927-30 the ACTU's affiliation 
to the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat, which was effectively 
a branch of the Moscow-based Red International of Labour 
Unions, was a result of Labor Council influence.28
MEMBERSHIP
In terms of membership, the Labor Council of NSW has remained 
by far the most important of the ACTU's state branches since
1927. This has occurred for two reasons. First, NSW has a large 
number of unionists, largely because it has been the most 
populous state in Australia throughout the twentieth century, and 
one of the two most industrialised states. Since unions 
traditionally have experienced greatest concentration in 
secondary industry, this has enabled unions to achieve a density 
of membership in excess of the Australian average throughout this 
century also, with the minor exceptions of the 1930s depression 
and 1949-50. Table 1 shows that from 1912 to 1922 and in the 
1940s this excess varied between 8 and 18 percentage points, 
although it became more marginal (never above 6 per centage 
points) from the 1950s, and by the 1990s had virtually
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disappeared.
Secondly, in comparison with other state bodies, the Labor 
Council has been able to achieve a relatively high proportion of 
affiliations from amongst those unions organising in the state for 
most of its history. The main exception was in the 1920s and 
early 1930s, although ironically, as we have seen, this period was 
one of the most nationally influential for the NSW Labor 
Council.29 From 1901, even prior to extending its jurisdicton from 
Sydney to the state as a whole in 1908, it has never faced a 
serious rival for the status of premier union organisation in the 
state. Although the AWU was a significant omission from the 
Council's affiliates for much of the first half of the century, it was 
never as important a union in NSW as it has been in Queensland, 
and so, never the genuine rival it was for the Brisbane TLC. Nor 
did the NSW Labor Council ever endure a major split of the kind 
which occurred in Victoria and took a third of that state's unions 
and half of its unionists outside the jurisdiction of the Victorian 
Trades Hall Council, to form a rival power centre from 1967- 
73.30
It is impossible to directly compare ACTU and Labor Council 
membership because of different jurisdictions and lack of reliable 
statistics for either organisation. Two general points, however, 
may be made. First, the proportion of unionists which each peak 
council covered in their respective jurisdictions appears to have 
been similar from the 1950s, as it slowly rose from about 65 per 
cent, but since NSW was more densely unionised throughout this 
period, the Labor Council actually enjoyed a stronger membership 
base. Secondly, unlike the ACTU, no major union remained 
unaffiliated to the Labor Council after the late 1930s, including 
the AWU which did not affiliate to the ACTU until 1967 31
Table 1 Unionised Proportion of Total Workforce, NSW and 
Commonwealth, 1912-1994
Year N SW% C'wth % Year NSW% C'wth %
1912 43 31 1954 65 61
1913 51 34 1955 63 60
1914 52 35 1956 63 58
1915 53 36 1957 62 58
1916 55 36 1958 61 57
1917 55 35 1959 60 58
1918 52 37 1960 60 58
1919 55 40 1961 59 56
1920 56 46 1962 57 56
1921 55 47 1963 57 56
1922 55 46 1964 56 55
1923 49 44 1965 56 54
1924 48 45 1966 54 52
1925 53 47 1967 54 51
1926 55 47 1968 53 51
1927 58 51 1969 53 50
1928 57 51 1970 52 50
1929 56 51 1971 56 51
1930 54 51 1972 56 52
1931 49 50 1973 57 53
1932 48 50 1974 59 55
1933 45 47 1975 59 56
1934 45 46 1976 58 56
1935 44 45 1977 57 55
1936 44 44 1978 58 55
1937 46 45 1979 57 56
1938 46 44 1980 59 57
1939 47 45 1981 59 56
1940 47 46 1982 60 57
1941 50 47 1983 59 55
1942 50 47 1984 58 55
1943 56 44 1985 53(60) 57
1944 57 44 1986 52(58) 50(55)
1945 56 44 1987 53(59) 49(55)
1946 61 50 1988 49(57) New 48(54) New
1947 64 56 1989 50(58) NSW 47(541 C’with
1948 66 58 1990 49(57) 48(57) 48(54) 46(52)
1949 55 58 1991 51(58) 48(55) 50(55) 47(53)
1950 57 59 1992 48(54) 45(51) 47(53) 44(49)
1951 60 60 1993 46(52) 43(48) 46(51) 43(47)
1952 61 56 1994 40(46) 38(44)
1953 61 59 1995 37(43) 35(40)
Sources: Commonwealth Labour Reports, Commonwealth Yearbook, 
and ABS Trade Union Statistics from 1974. Figures from 1985 are for 
financial members, with total members in brackets.
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By the 1980s the Labor Council of NSW accounted for almost
40 per cent of total ACTU membership.32 From the mid-1970s its 
affiliated membership had grown dramatically because of the 
upsurge in white collar and public sector unionism. Many of these 
remained outside the Labor Council and ACTU at that point, 
and were affiliated to their own national peak organisations, the 
Australian Council of Salaried and Professional Associations 
(ACSPA) and the Council of Australian Government Employee 
Organisations (CAGEO). However, ACSPA merged with the 
ACTU in 1979, and CAGEO followed suit in 1981. ACTU rules 
for affiliation of national unions required that they affiliate also 
with at least one of its state branches. Virtually all of the 
previously unaffiliated ACSPA and CAGEO unions joined the 
Labor Council of NSW first, and in some cases, only that state 
branch of the ACTU.
By 1983, two years after the ACTU’s absorption of ACSPA 
and CAGEO, the proportion of unionists in unions affiliated to 
the ACTU and Labor Council of NSW in their separate 
jurisdictions was 89 and 96 per cent respectively. The NSW 
Labor Council figure was 5 per cent higher than for the Victorian 
Trades Hall Council, and much higher than for other state labour 
councils. (The Western Australian Trades and Labour Council 
enjoyed the third highest affiliated membership, with 74 per 
cent).33 By 1989, when the number of Labor Council affiliates 
reached an all-time record of 132, even though the total number of 
unions declined as a result of amalgamations, there was no union 
of any significance that remained unaffiliated to the Labor 
Council, in contrast to other state labour councils.34 Most 
significantly, the proportion of unionists in organisations 
affiliated to the ACTU was also lower in other states.35 This 
suggests that the Labor Council of NSW has actually boosted the 
level of ACTU affiliated membership since the early 1980s.
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Recent disaffiliations from both peak councils are too recent to 
suggest any significant trends. The secession of the TWU from the 
ACTU, whilst remaining affiliated to the Labor Council, and the 
secession of the Australian Manufacturing Workers Union 
(formerly the Metalworkers) from the Labor Council, whilst 
remaining affiliated to the ACTU, appear to be isolated events. In 
any case, the respective gains and losses are even.
INDUSTRIAL ROLE
The long term numerical strength and representativeness of the 
Labor Council has assisted it in developing a significant 
industrial role in the state, which has usually surpassed that of 
the ACTU at a national level. Historically, the ACTU has played 
a very limited role in control of strikes, or intervention in their 
settlement. Despite the post Second World War growth in 
intervention by the ACTU in some key national industries, it was 
not until the era of the Hawke presidency that the ACTU began 
to regularly intervene in industrial disputes. Since then, this role 
has been confirmed and even expanded by the special 
circumstances of wage indexation and the Accord.
The Labor Council, in contrast, has frequently been in a 
position to exert a high degree of control over disputes, and been 
willing to do so, with peaks of control in the 1880s and early 
1890s, during the special circumstances of the First and Second 
World Wars, and from the 1940s through to the mid-1960s.36 For 
most of this century the Labor Council has preferred to avoid 
industrial action where possible, particularly when it is likely to 
electorally damage the Labor Party, but even during the period of 
the ascendancy of the right in the Council's leadership, after the 
Second World War, this did not necessarily mean a total rejection 
of the strike weapon. The Council was willing to co-ordinate 
industrial campaigns on a number of occasions, such as for eight
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hours in the 1870s, 1970s and 1980s. Nor did the Council's 
officers necessarily exert control over industrial action from the 
centre; the Building Trades Group of Council traditionally 
managed its own affairs in a relatively autonomous manner, even 
though it usually included some militant unions, because it was 
generally self-reliant, rarely embroiled other unions in its troubles, 
and usually applied the strike weapon judiciously.37
The reason that the Labor Council could function with a 
relatively high degree of control over disputes, notwithstanding a 
constitution which, like the ACTU's, gave it limited formal 
authority in this area, was that affiliates were willing to 
acknowledge Council authority in this way. ACTU intervention in 
disputes, such as it has been, has also relied on this informal 
concession of authority by affiliates. However, the degree of this 
concession seems to have been greater over time with the Labor 
Council, which has also been willing to more forcefully exert its 
authority in those peak periods described above than the ACTU 
has generally been able to do.
Historically, even if the ACTU did intervene in a dispute, it 
usually did so through one of its state branches, i.e. the labour 
councils, because they were their agents 'on the ground’. Limited 
staff and resources, together with the ’tyranny of distance’ if a 
dispute occurred outside Victoria, placed great restrictions upon 
the ability of the Melbourne-based ACTU to intervene in many 
disputes until well after the Second World War. Even with 
modern improvements in transport and communications since 
then, and with more recent improvements in the staff resources of 
the ACTU, it is not equipped for regular intervention in a wide 
range of disputes beyond those of special national significance. It 
still must function largely through the labour councils because 
these state branches are usually closer to the parties involved. 
This role is underwritten in legislation for the Labor Council of 
NSW, in a way which federal legislation does not provide for the
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ACTU. An amendment to the state Industrial Arbitration Act in 
1981 gave the Labor Council the right to appear in all disputes 
before the Industrial Commission, and this clause was retained in 
the new Industrial Relations Act of 1991.38
The importance of the NSW industrial system within a dual 
system of arbitration in the Australian federal framework also 
fostered an important industrial role for the Labor Council. A 
significant majority of NSW workers have always been covered 
by state awards. The NSW arbitration system was the first to 
become effective in Australia, and it arguably remained more 
important than the federal system for many years for NSW 
workers, even after the 1907 Harvester judgment which created 
the basic wage system. NSW established its own basic wage 
system in 1914, before the federal system covered many workers 
at all, and the NSW basic wage continued after the abolition of 
the federal basic wage system in 1967. The Labor Council has 
enjoyed a major role in submission of general wage cases and 
some other test cases before the state Industrial Commission, in 
much the same way as the ACTU has before the federal tribunal. 
Automatic quarterly cost of living adjustments to the state basic 
wage (as with its federal counterpart) reduced this role somewhat 
from 1920-64, but it is noteworthy that this role was enhanced 
from 1964-74 because of the coincidence of the abolition of 
automatic quarterly cost of living adjustments and the 
continuation of the basic wage at the NSW level.
This role continued even as the system became more 
centralised from the mid-1970s. When the federal commission 
adopted its wage indexation guidelines in 1975, the state 
commission did also, but it did vary federal decisions slightly, 
and wage increases were not automatic. After the abandonment 
of wage indexation in 1981, the Labor Council continued to 
present a state wage case, even after 1983, when the federal 
commission, followed by its state counterparts, adopted a new
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centralised system based upon the Accord.39 In the past, and still 
even in recent times, it has been responsible for a small number of 
test cases which have pioneered union gains through the federal 
and other state systems. The most recent example was the case 
which extended family leave entitlements to gay couples.
RESOURCES
The Labor Council of NSW has always had a greater level of 
resources than the ACTU. The Council had a full-time secretary 
from the beginning of the 20th century, and a full-time assistant 
secretary in 1938, five years before the ACTU's first full-time 
secretary. The ACTU's second full-time officer, its president, was 
not appointed until 1949. Further extensions to the ACTU's 
specialist staff did not occur until 1967, with three additions, 
followed by a further three over the next four years.40 By the 
early 1970s however, the NSW Labor Council had also embarked 
on a significant expansion in its own specialist staff, which grew 
from three to thirteen to 1983. This staff continued to grow during 
the 1980s, but in that decade the ACTU's staff also expanded 
rapidly. By 1996 the ACTU staff of 38 was slightly more than 
twice that of the Labor Council.41 This ratio corresponded with 
the respective affiliated memberships of both organisations.
The considerable growth in ACTU and Labor Council staff of 
the 1980s and 1990s was partly due to the growth in income 
generated by a higher level of affiliations and of per capita fees 
paid by affiliates. It was also dependent upon Labor government 
support for specific programs, particularly in the case of the 
ACTU, since the Labor Council lived with a non-sympathetic 
Liberal/National State government from 1988 to 1994. However, 
as the Labor Council discovered in that period, resources 
dependent upon political largesse are unreliable, and its number 
of officers actually declined for a period under non-Labor rule. To
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the extent that ACTU staff resources depend upon the 
continuation of a federal Labor government, they indicate a 
potential weakness.
The greatest resource advantage, however, which is enjoyed by 
the Labor Council of NSW is a result of historical accident; 
namely the 1925 decision to establish the first labour radio 
station in the world, 2KY. Through its generation of advertising 
revenue this investment has always given the Labor Council a 
level of financial security independent of its income from 
affiliation fees. The income from 2KY grew dramatically as a 
result of secretary Barrie Unsworth's securing of the TAB contract 
to broadcast races. By the early 1990s this income alone was 
worth $2 million to the Council, funding many of its expanded 
activities.42
POLITICAL ROLE
However, the single most important factor which has shaped the 
significance of the Labor Council has been its special relationship 
with the state branch of the Australian Labor Party (ALP), which 
has enjoyed more electoral success than any other branch of the 
Party. The Labor Council formed the Labor Party in 1891, and in 
that same year the Party achieved the balance of parliamentary 
power in the first election that it contested. Although there is 
some debate as to which state branch of the Party was formed 
first - NSW, Queensland or South Australia - the NSW Party 
clearly achieved the first significant parliamentary presence. In 
1910 the NSW branch formed the first full majority state ALP 
government, in the same year that it achieved this success at the 
national level for the first time, relying on NSW seats to a 
significant extent. Since 1910 the ALP in NSW has been in 
government for 47 of 85 years, or 55 per cent of the time, 
including an unbroken quarter of a century of office from 1941 to
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1965. Although the Labor Council lost direct control of the ALP 
at an early stage in the 1890s, it has maintained a close 
relationship with the ALP's NSW branch. Since the early 1900s a 
high proportion of the Labor Council's affiliates have been 
affiliated to the ALP, with union delegates usually accounting for
60 per cent of the total at state ALP conferences. Through the 
support that it could muster at conferences, the Labor Council 
has consistently enjoyed representation on the Party executive 
and a significant influence on Party policy, especially regarding 
industrial matters. From the 1940s the major mechanism for this 
influence was the ALP's industrial committee, which essentially 
prepared the ALP's legislative agendas. Labor Council officers 
traditionally dominated this committee, to such an extent in the 
1950s and 1960s that newspaper reporters often failed to 
distinguish between it and the Council's executive.43
This situation has provided the Labor Council with 
tremendous opportunities to influence industrial legislation, since 
under the federal constitution most industrial powers have 
resided with the states, rather than the Commonwealth. 
Improvements in industrial conditions through legislation, 
therefore, have been usually instigated by state ALP governments. 
The electoral success of the NSW branch of the ALP has given it 
the greatest opportunities in this way, opportunities which NSW 
governments of the ALP have usually grasped, under the 
influence of the Labor Council.
The best example of how this has worked to the benefit of all 
Australian workers has been with the general reduction in 
working hours. The first workers to achieve the 48 hour working 
week (or 8 hour day, six days per week) were building tradesmen 
in Melbourne and Sydney in the 1850s, as a result of union 
action.44 Subsequently, the first extension of this 'boon' was to 
metal tradesmen in Sydney in the 1870s, as a result of an 
industrial campaign organised by the Labor Council.45 For the
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next fifteen years the Council and individual unions attempted by 
industrial action to extend the eight hour day to a number of 
other trades, but with limited or temporary success, because few 
other unions wielded the strategic bargaining power of the 
building and metal tradesmen.46 From an early stage, therefore, 
the Council sought to overcome these weaknesses with general 
legislation through the Labor Party. The first general legislative 
reduction, to a 44 hour week, was introduced by the Storey ALP 
government in 1920. The gain was initially shortlived, because of 
repeal by a Nationalist government, and after its reintroduction 
by the Lang ALP government in 1925 it was repealed again. Lang 
permanently restored the 44 hour week in 1930. In 1947 the 40 
hour week was also first introduced by an ALP government in 
NSW (followed soon afterwards by the Queensland ALP 
government). In both cases the state legislation provided an 
important base from which the ACTU was able to generalise 
reduced hours through the Commonwealth Arbitration Court (as 
it then was), with the NSW government intervening in that Court's 
proceedings on behalf of the unions.47
Although further reductions in working hours in the 1970s and 
1980s occurred on an industry or occupational, rather than 
general basis, the NSW Labor Council provided the main 
leadership, in the public and private sectors.48 In 1957 the ACTU 
Congress adopted the 35 hour week as its policy, targeting the 
coal and power generation industries as the best points at which 
to start. The first breakthrough for reduced hours came when the 
state Labor government granted a 37 and a half hour week to 
NSW miners, as a result of Labor Council and mining unions' 
pressure. However, after the failure of a 35 hour claim before the 
Coal Industry Tribunal in 1960, little was done to implement the 
35 hours policy for some years, despite its consistent 
reaffirmation at subsequent Congresses. Again, in 1965 the 
ACTU reaffirmed its policy as a matter of priority, but with little
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more impact than before. However, it was significant in 1965 that 
the ACTU Congress ceded titular, as well as effective, leadership 
of the campaign to its state branches, with particular reference to 
the Labor Council of NSW. The main focus from 1969 became the 
NSW Electricity Commission, where the Labor Council led a 
campaign involving negotiations, Industrial Commission hearings 
and industrial action for the next ten years. Finally, in 1979 a 38 
hour week was achieved. From 1980-7 this gain spread 
throughout the NSW public sector, on an individual departmental 
or authority basis, as the result of negotiations led by the Labor 
Council. Most NSW public servants had reduced working hours 
by 1985.
A major momentum for generalisation of the 38 hour week 
occurred as a result of these breakthoughs in the NSW public 
sector, arising out of Labor Council pressure on the then state 
ALP government. In the private sector the wharf labourers and 
coal miners had gained 35 hours in 1970-1 by collective 
bargaining, with the assistance of the ACTU. But their cases were 
exceptional and by their nature did not flow on to other 
industries. Sporadic action in the oil industry at this time, co­
ordinated by the ACTU, failed to gain reduced hours. However, 
soon after the breakthrough in the Electricity Commission, the 
Labor Council's intervention during strike action in the brewing 
industry achieved a 35 hour week as part of a package involving 
technological change. At that point the Metal Workers' Union 
instigated a concerted campaign for the 35 hour week on a plant- 
by-plant basis, initially with the participation of all unions in the 
Metal Trades Federation, and with the support of the ACTU. 
However, after the federal Arbitration Commission threatened to 
withhold wage increases tinder the wage indexation system then 
operating, the ACTU and a number of metal unions withdrew 
from the campaign for a time. Nevertheless, the Metal Workers 
persisted, achieving reductions on a plant-by-plant basis,
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especially after the collapse of wage indexation in 1981. From 
1981 the Labor Council regained leadership of the general 
reduced hours campaign, organising stopwork rallies, and co­
ordinating or leading the negotiations in a number of significant 
cases, including CSR chemicals (36-hour week), Hunter Valley 
construction sites, and ship building and repair. The public and 
private sector campaigns of the Labor Council and the Metal 
Workers' Union were able to feed off each other for the remainder 
of the 1980s, usually under the jurisdiction of the federal 
Arbitration Commission, which adopted a 38 hour week 
standard, based on productivity trade-offs on an industry or 
plant basis. Indeed, by 1983 a majority of the workforce already 
enjoyed the 38 hour week.49
The Labor Council also led the way in the continual extension 
of annual leave for Australian workers, through a similar process 
to that which had gained the earlier (pre-38 hours) reductions in 
working hours. In 1944 the ALP government of NSW legislated to 
extend annual leave for workers under state awards from one to 
two weeks, and in December 1945 this flowed on to pace-setting 
printers and metal workers under federal awards, from whence it 
eventually spread further when the Commonwealth Arbitration 
Court adopted this as a general standard. The state government 
then legislated for three weeks annual leave in 1958, and the 
Commonwealth Commission (as the Court had become) extended 
the NSW gain to federal awards in 1963. Following this, the NSW 
Labor government granted four weeks annual leave to state 
employees in 1964, only four years after the Labor Council had 
originally endorsed this demand, but only three years after the 
Commonwealth Arbitration Commission had originally rejected 
three weeks leave, and ten years before four weeks annual leave 
was generalised throughout the rest of Australia by other ALP 
governments and finally, by the Commonwealth Arbitration 
Commission.50
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NSW Labor governments, prodded on by the Labor Council, 
initiated industrial reforms in a number of other areas. Long 
service leave was first introduced in NSW by legislation in 1951 
and 1955. A fter further im provem ents in 1963, the 
Commonwealth Arbitration Commission granted long service 
leave in federal awards, again after intervention by the NSW 
Labor government in support of an ACTU submission.51
The issue of equal pay motivated the Labor Council at an 
early stage, well before the ACTU became involved in this 
campaign. As early as 1924 the Labor Council resolved support 
for a uniform basic wage for men and women. Four years later it 
placed an organiser at the disposal of the Militant Women's 
Group to assist it in organising women workers and campaigning 
for equal pay for equal work.52 In 1937 Council affiliates formed 
the Council of Action for Equal Pay, and it continued to lobby 
over the issue during the second world war. During the war the 
ACTU held a number of union conferences and began lobbying for 
equal pay, largely as a result of its affiliates fearing the 
permanent displacement of male members by cheaper female 
workers who maintained industrial output during the absence of 
the men in the armed forces.53 After the war, the issue subsided 
for a time as troops returned to displace women from the 
wartime factories, and the unions engaged in long campaigns for 
basic wage and margins increases and reduced working hours.
It was the Labor Council which revived the equal pay 
campaign from 1949. In 1950 it successfully persuaded the state 
government to legislate to equalise the state female basic wage 
with the higher federal version, which had been increased to 75 
per cent of the male basic wage. For a time thereafter, the Labor 
Council was more concerned with a major margins case, but from 
1956, it revived the equal pay campaign. In 1957 the Labor 
Council called on the ACTU to organise a national conference 
and lobby government over the issue.54 Its equal pay committee,
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formed at this time, requested the ACTU 'in all future wage 
claims to incorporate the common basic wage irrespective of 
se x '.55 Largely as a result of Council lobbying, the NSW 
government in 1958 legislated again to prevent the Industrial 
Commission from absorbing margins into the higher female basic 
wage, and required the Commission to provide equal pay for 
work 'of a like nature and of equal value' in the marginal or 
secondary portion of women's wages. A year later the female 
basic wage was increased to 80 per cent of the male rate, and 
thereafter, was to be increased by 5 per cent per annum, until 
equal to males in 1963. However, equal pay was not applicable 
to predominantly female work, where most women worked.56 
Pressure mounted for full equal pay in the early 1960s, 
particularly from the Teachers' Federation. Yet, NSW took a 
backwards step in 1964, when it equalised the state basic wage 
with the federal version, which then involved a downwards 
movement for the female basic wage.57 By 1969 only about 14 per 
cent of those women under state awards had gained equal pay. 
Although this was a somewhat higher proportion than in 
Australia as a whole, it represented a failure on the part of the 
Labor Council and the state government. By the end of the 1960s 
the main focus for achieving equal pay was at the federal level.58
In all of these areas, the NSW labour movement, led by the 
Labor Council, became the pacesetter for industrial gains for the 
rest of Australia. Apart from the limited successes in the area of 
equal pay, these gains were some of the greatest on the industrial 
front in the history of the labour movement, and in many respects 
NSW labour led the world in its industrial achievements.
RELATIVE AUTONOMY OF THE LABOR COUNCIL OF NSW
Because of its size, high level of resources, and the dual nature of 
the federal structure of industrial relations in Australia, the Labor
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Council has also operated with a high degree of autonomy from 
the ACTU in practice. It is inconceivable that it would follow the 
recent example of the Queensland Trades and labor Council in 
adopting the title of 'Queensland Branch of the ACTU'. The 
’tyranny of distance’ contributed to NSW autonomy in early 
times, of course. The location of the ACTU in Melbourne has 
allowed the NSW Labor Council a larger degree of autonomy than 
if it had been in Sydney, and its proximity to the ACTU may 
have retarded the development of a stronger Victorian Trades 
Hall Council. But in itself this is insufficient explanation, for other 
state labour councils even more distant from Melbourne did not 
develop the same degree of autonomy. The continuation of the 
Labor Council’s autonomy since the improvements in modern 
transport and communications, indicate more complex trends. 
With the institutional concentration of the national offices of 
many unions, together with the federal industrial commission and 
the major national peak employer councils all based in 
Melbourne, a partial institutional vacuum was left at the state 
level of union leadership to be filled by labour councils. The NSW 
Labor Council had the critical mass in terms of affiliated 
membership, and the institutional framework through the NSW 
arbitration system, to develop a virtually rival centre of union 
power and leadership. Underlying all of this, it appears that the 
ambiguous relationship between the two bodies encompasses a 
degree of Sydney-Melbourne rivalry, which permeates so many 
institutional relationships in Australia.
Ideology and factional loyalties often provided a broader 
motivation for autonomy than merely state loyalties. In the 1920s 
and for much of the 1930s the Labor Council was under the 
radical and militant leadership of ’Jock’ Garden and his 
associates, whereas the ACTU was dominated by more 
conservative national and Melbourne-based unions.59 Conversely, 
by the 1970s a right-wing Labor Council leadership faced a
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centre-left domination of the ACTU.60 Under all of these 
circumstances, the NSW Labor Council has never achieved 
dominance of the ACTU leadership, nor even provided a 
president or secretary. The only break in recruitment for these 
positions from Melbourne-based union officials occurred when 
Cliff Dolan was president from 1981-5, and although he had been 
a Labor Council delegate years before, he had long since ceased to 
play an active role on the Labor Council. Indeed, for most of the 
period from the late 1960s to the early 1990s, it is notable that 
the senior labour council secretary in the country did not hold the 
senior vice-presidency of the ACTU.61 On the other hand, the 
importance of the Labor Council meant that the ACTU could not 
fail to consult with its leadership before taking major decisions. 
The attraction of this situation for the Labor Council was that, 
since its officers were not bound by decisions reached by the 
ACTU's inner circle of leadership, of which it was generally not 
part, its ability to operate independently was accordingly 
increased.62
PRESENT AND FUTURE
The argument for the future significance of the NSW Labor 
Council must by its nature be more speculative than the historical 
record. There has been a continuous trend for the enhancement of 
the status and authority of the ACTU since the time of the 
Hawke presidency, with a significant intensification of this 
process from the time of the Prices and Incomes Accord in 1983, 
and its various new versions. Much of this enhancement of the 
ACTU's status and authority has been on an informal basis. But 
there is no doubt that its affiliates, which represent virtually all 
unions in the country, employers, government and the Australian 
Industrial Relations Commission (as it became in 1988) have 
ceded this authority in the last twelve years.
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Since 1988 there has also been an unmistakable shift in the 
balance of industrial powers from the state to the federal sphere, 
which will tend to reduce the importance of state government 
industrial legislation. This has been based on more expansive 
High Court interpretations of the Commonwealth corporations 
and external affairs powers under the constitution, which have 
allowed the federal government to intervene more directly in 
industrial matters, over, for example, unfair dismissals and 
minimum standards for enterprise bargaining.63 This, together 
with the longest period of federal ALP government in Australian 
history, means that the ACTU has come to wield the type of 
influence at a national level that the Labor Council has long 
wielded at state level with ALP governments. Indeed, given the 
precedence that federal industrial legislation now appears to take 
over state legislation, the ACTU might be seen by some as 
supplanting the Labor Council's role.
Nevertheless, a number of current trends in Australian 
industrial relations suggest that the foundations for the ACTU's 
enhanced industrial status may only be of a temporary nature.64 
Politically, the ACTU will always have an important role of 
consultation with government, particularly Labor governments. 
However, the specially influential role which it now enjoys will 
inevitably be diminished greatly when the ALP eventually suffers 
electoral defeat at the national level. At the same time, the Labor 
Council's role of influence in government has just been rejuvenated 
with the return of an ALP government in NSW. One aspect of the 
shift of influence to the national level had been the absence of 
ALP government in NSW over the past eight years. The ACTU 
and federal ALP have a long way to go before they can equal the 
long term relationship between the NSW Labor Council and ALP, 
and its consequent impact on government.
Nor is the shift of the balance of legislative power in industrial 
matters to the federal sphere as total or as settled as some
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commentators have suggested. The corporations power under the 
constitution is subject to various limitations which limit federal 
jurisdiction to corporations, interstate trade or commerce, 
Commonwealth Territories, or parties to contracts with the 
Commonwealth or its agents. The main impact of these 
limitations would be to remove much of small business from 
federal jurisdiction. Furthermore, in the application of ILO 
conventions under its external affairs powers, the federal 
government may be principally involved with establishing 
minimum, rather than absolute, standards. If this is the case, 
state legislation would need to equal the federal provisions, but 
may improve upon it. There are clear indications that the current 
federal and NSW governments interpret the situation in this 
w ay 65, but it is too early to ascertain how permanent this 
interpretation is, especially without being able to predict the 
impact of a change of government.
More substantially, the widespread change in the structure 
and operation of Australian unionism, much of which has 
actually been instigated by the ACTU, is likely to diminish its 
direct industrial role. The decentralisation of the industrial 
relations system and the encouragement of enterprise level 
bargaining have removed the most important industrial role 
historically performed by the ACTU: namely, the presentation of 
union submissions for national wage cases. There does not 
appear to be a major role to replace this. True, the ACTU remains 
important in managing industrial campaigns and settling disputes 
in some key industries, and to some extent it has attempted to 
co-ordinate enterprise bargaining. But its ability to perform this 
co-ordinating role is limited at the national level, especially given 
the relatively limited resources available to the ACTU for this 
purpose. To the extent that the ACTU does co-ordinate 
industrial activity it relies heavily on its state branches, the labour 
councils. The NSW Council itself has a substantial portfolio of
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significant industries and firms for which it co-ordinates 
bargaining. It is a role which has emerged strongly for the Labor 
Council since the late 1970s, when it attempted to standardise 
the terms of a relatively large number of redundancy agreements 
negotiated at the time.66 Recent successes of the South Coast 
Labour Council in NSW in negotiating agreements to govern major 
new construction projects, also indicates the potential for 
provincial labour councils in this area.67 Labour councils at the 
state or provincial level have the advantage over the ACTU of 
being closer to their constituents and 'the coalface', of having 
longer experience at this level, and in the case of the state bodies 
at least, of having greater resources at this level.
The ACTU's strategy for the creation of 20 large super unions, 
which is proceeding apace, also has negative implications for the 
future industrial role of the ACTU. Insofar as this policy achieves 
success in concentrating union resource bases to facilitate 
effective enterprise bargaining, the new super unions will be far 
more self-reliant and less likely to rely upon co-ordination by the 
ACTU. The recent unprecedented disaffiliation from the ACTU 
by the TWU may be an indication of what the future holds in this 
regard, although the disaffiliation of the AMWU from both the 
NSW and South Coast labour councils indicates that peak bodies 
could suffer at that level as well. Although it is too early to 
predict with any certainty, the historical record would suggest 
that both levels of disaffiliation are temporary. More importantly 
in the long term, it is by no means clear that all of the super 
unions will survive in their current form. Many recent 
amalgamations are entirely impractical political marriages of 
convenience, with little industrial rationale. In some cases the 
amalgamated bodies continue to operate effectively as separate 
unions, to the extent of opposing each other in tribunals in at 
least one case.68 Since the Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 has 
reduced the minimum size of federally registered unions to 100
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members, from the 1990 minimum of 10,000, which was intended 
to encourage union amalgamations,69 it will be possible for new 
smaller unions covering unorganised marginal groups (such as 
artists70) to become registered. Something like this may be 
necessary to arrest the decline of union membership which has 
characterised the period of super unionism - larger unions 
covering fewer workers - which are not perceived as relevant to 
their needs by workers because of their bureaucratic modus 
operandi and a weak workplace or service-oriented presence. It is 
extremely significant in this regard that the Labor Council of 
NSW has been the foremost, virtually lone, critic of the ACTU's 
amalgamation policy.71
CONCLUSIONS
If there is any serious challenge to the current trends in 
restructuring, therefore, they will be based in the senior Labor 
Council in this country, in NSW. Unlike other state bodies, the 
Labor Council has the will to maintain an independent industrial 
role which will be at least as important as that of the ACTU. This 
is based on its historical achievements and expectations based 
upon them, its stable relationship with a state branch of the ALP 
which remains far more successful electorally than any other, its 
far greater resource base than any other peak body in Australia, 
including the ACTU, and the willingness of its leadership to 
develop alternative visions of the nature of unionism in the future.
Historically, the Labor Council of NSW has been the main 
instigator of industrial reform in Australia, operating with a high 
degree of autonomy from the ACTU. The circumstances which 
have enabled it to play that role - the strength of unionism in 
NSW, the importance of the NSW industrial relations system and 
its part in it, its close relationship with frequent state Labor 
governments, and the farsighted decision to establish its own
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radio station - have all been important for the greater part of the 
20th century, and continue to be so. In contrast, the special 
circumstances which have increased the significance of the ACTU 
in the past 20 years are too recent and unstable to say that it has 
displaced the Labor Council yet.
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